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In this paper we explore the role of affective encounters between human and non-
human bodies in the proliferation of new technologies within and across work 
organisations. Our exploration challenges not only the long-standing rationalism 
within studies of technological innovation but the anthropocentrism of burgeoning 
studies of technology, innovation and affect. Responding to these proclivities, we 
propose and elaborate an affective Actor-Network Theory (ANT) as an alternative 
analytical approach by cross-fertilizing ANT concepts with Deleuze’s reading of the 
affective philosophy of Spinoza. Our approach is elaborated further with the 
technological innovation of zero-carbon homes in the United Kingdom. Affective 
ANT is proposed to explain the profound role of affects in the circulation of 
technologies and technologies in the circulation of affects. This theory contributes by 
challenging: studies of affect, innovation and technology to examine the significance 
of relational human affects in the proliferation of new technologies; organisational 
studies to consider the interplay of human and technical affects; and Deleuzo-
Spinozian organisational studies to conceptualize how affects are organised to serve 





Organisational scholarship has long been concerned with how new technologies proliferate 
across work organisations (Orlikowski and Barley, 2001). Across recent decades research has 
not only considered how specific socio-institutional contexts influence the proliferation of new 
technologies, from neoliberal capitalism (Fleming, 2018) to professional associations (Swan 
and Newell, 1995), but also how those contexts and technologies are shaped by encounters 
with human agents, including: opinion leaders (Fitzgerald, 2002), professionals (Korica and 
Molloy, 2011), and entrepreneurs (Hung, 2004). Related organisational research (Cochoy, 
2009; Harrison and Laberge, 2002; Joerges and Czarniawka, 1998; Locke and Lowe, 2007)., 
strongly influenced by Actor-Network Theory (ANT) (Callon, 1986; Latour, 1987), has also 
challenged the idea that the proliferation of new technologies involves the circulation of 
discrete material objects and fixed designs and uses. Technological proliferation is instead 
reframed as a socio-material process where technologies spread through adaptations of their 
designs and uses as human and non-human agencies are transformed and enrolled in support 
of technologies (Akirch et al. 2002). Recent organisational studies of technologies are thus 
increasingly defined by explorations of how lived encounters between humans and non-humans 
influence the development, circulation, use and transformation of new technologies.  
 
Despite this attention to encounters with technologies, this research contains a significant 
blindspot: it desists from engaging with the affectivity of organisational life (Lamprou, 2017). 
The significance of this neglect of affect is increasingly thrown into relief by a series of mostly 
psychological studies (e.g. Chaudhuri et al. 2010; Choi et al. 2011; Wood and Moreau, 2006) 
exploring the mediating role of human affects in the proliferation of technological innovations. 
Yet, while this scholarship on affect, innovation and technology offers a compelling corrective 
to rationalist treatments of innovation diffusion (e.g. Rogers, 2003), it remains disconnected 
from organisational studies of technologies and its focus on lived encounters with technologies. 
Consequently, technologies are conceptualized as affectively inert, discrete, material objects, 
instilled with fixed designs and uses, while the congruence of expectations about those designs 
and uses induces human affective responses that exogenously influence the spread of those 
objects (Chaudhuri et al. 2010; Choi et al. 2011). Our purpose in this paper is to challenge both 
the rationalism of organisational studies of technology and the anthropocentrism of burgeoning 
studies of technology, innovation and affect. We instead explore how transformative 
encounters between human and non-human bodies mediate affects that do not exogenously 
shape, but more profoundly constitute the proliferation of new technologies within 
organisational life.  
 
Our approach interweaves ANT (Actor-Network Theory) technology studies (Akrich et al. 
2002; Callon, 1986; De Laet and Mol, 2000; Latour, 1987; Law, 2002) with Deleuze’s reading 
of the affective philosophy of Spinoza (Deleuze; 1988; 1992; 2017). Our decision to cross-
fertilize ANT with Deleuzo-Spinozian theories of affect is partly inspired by insightful 
arguments by the geographers Müller and Schurr (2016) that Deleuzo-Guattarian affect 
theories can help in exploring the (affective) conditions that enable new technologies to 
proliferate through actor-networking processes, while ANT can assist Deleuzo-Guattarian 
thinking in explaining how those processes are subject to purposive organisation, as in 
management. But instead of effecting one-way theory borrowing into organisation studies 
(Oswick et al. 2011), we develop Müller and Schurr’s (2016) thinking – especially their lack 
of specificity in how particular concepts in ANT and Deleuzo-Spinozian thinking relate – 
through empirical theory elaboration (Fisher and Aguinis, 2017). Indeed, our re-thinking of 
ANT with affect was originally empirically inspired within a government funded research 
project following UK ‘zero-carbon’ housebuilding technologies with ANT. Several 
ethnographic encounters with housebuilders awarded for their ‘pride’ in innovating (NHBC 
New Homes, 2016), suggested to us that the ANT refrain of ‘following the actors them 
themselves or rather that which makes them act’ (Latour, 2005: 237) falls short when following 
how technologies are organised through and with affects. But rather than simply diagnose the 
limitations of ANT to register affect (e.g. Lamprou, 2017: 1744; Thrift, 2008: 113), we move 
to develop some overlooked potentials in ANT to engage with affect – potentials which, to us, 
are best realised when ANT is connected to Deleuzo-Spinozian, not Deleuzo-Guattarian, 
theories of affect (Deleuze; 1988; 1992; 2017). Thus while the primary purpose of our paper is 
to inform organisation studies of technology, affect and innovation, we also intend it to 
contribute to wider discussions on the affectivity of ANT (e.g. Lamprou, 2017; Latour, 1999; 
2004; Müller and Schurr, 2016; Thrift, 2008) and Deleuzo-Spinozian scholarship on 
organisation and affect (Anderson, 2012; Carnera, 2012; Hjorth and Holt, 2014; Michels and 
Stayaert, 2017; Pullen et al. 2017; Thanem and Wallenberg, 2015).  
 
Two questions guide our cross-fertilization of ANT/Deleuzo-Spinozian thinking. The first 
concerns how Deleuzo-Spinozian affect theories can inform ANT: how is the purposeful 
organisational work of the kind that enables the proliferation of ostensibly discrete 
technologies, conceptualized here as actor-networking, constituted by affective bodily 
encounters? The second question corresponds with how ANT can inform Deleuzo-Spinozian 
affect theories: can such affective encounters themselves be purposefully organised, or actor-
networked, by managers to serve their interests and agendas? The imperative to ask these two 
questions would seem particularly salient for organisational scholars due to both the neglect of 
affect in ANT organisational studies (e.g. Cochoy, 2009; Harrison and Laberge, 2002; Locke 
and Lowe, 2007), and the predisposition within extant Deleuzo-Spinozian organisational 
studies (Carnera, 2012; Hjorth and Holt, 2014; Michels and Stayaert, 2017; Pullen et al. 2017; 
Thanem and Wallenberg, 2015) to emphasize the transformative openness of affective life 
rather than explore its involvement in purposeful organisation, as in the management of 
technological innovations.   
 
We arrive at our exploration of these two questions across five sections. First, we critique the 
anthropocentric limitations of extant studies of affect, innovation and technology. Secondly, 
we start to elaborate our alternative approach by re-reading ANT with sporadic expositions of 
affect by ANT proponents (e.g. Latour, 1999; 2004; Müller and Schurr, 2016). Thirdly, we 
engage with Deleuze’s reading of Spinoza’s affective philosophy (Deleuze, 1988; 1992; 2017) 
to overcome the shortcomings of ANT expositions of affect, particularly a reliance on 
happenstance and a neglect of human agency. We then specify the concepts and relations of 
our cross-fertilized approach with an empirical study of zero-carbon housebuilding and directly 
explore our two research questions. We conclude by discussing the multifaceted contributions 
of our proposed ‘affective ANT’ within and beyond organisation studies.  
 
Affect and technologies 
Studies of the proliferation of new technologies have long been gripped by a cool rationalism 
(Chaudhuri et al. 2010). Exemplifying this proclivity, Rogers’ (2003) much-cited diffusion 
framework revolves around four coldly rationalist concepts to explain the circulation of 
technologies – innovation properties (relative advantage), communication channels 
(knowledge of the innovation), time (rate of adoption) and social systems (influence of social 
structures such as power hierarchies). This rationalist orientation is increasingly being 
questioned within a burgeoning body of scholarship employing mostly psychological theories 
of affect to explain the spread of new technologies (Chaudhuri et al. 2010; Choi et al. 2011; 
Wood and Moreau, 2006). These studies explain how rational decisions over what technologies 
to develop, adopt and use are always mediated through human affects, from delight to anger. 
Less explicitly, this work also acknowledges such affects might be technologically mediated. 
For example, it is in the congruence between linguistic-cognitive expectations about the 
simplicity of a technological innovation (e.g. a mobile phone) and lived interactions with its 
more or less simple materiality that affects, such as delight/anger, are said to be formed, 
fostering respective adoption/rejection (e.g. Chaudhuri et al. 2010; Choi et al. 2011; Wood and 
Moreau, 2006).  
 
These affective studies of technology diffusion challenge organisational studies of technology 
to consider the shaping influence of (human) affects in the proliferation of technologies across 
work organisations. However, these approaches remain limited in developing more profound 
insights into the affective role of technologies as they employ survey-based and experimental 
methods that cannot (and do not set out to) analyse lived encounters between humans and non-
humans. In particular, this work largely dichotomizes such encounters as a relationship 
between affectively charged humans and affectively inert technologies. Technologies, to the 
extent they can influence human affects can only do so as a passive and predictable affective 
stimuli, for example as related to congruence between their designed properties and user 
expectations (see e.g. Chaudhuri et al. 2010; Wood and Moreau, 2006). This notion of the 
affective force of technologies as reducible to their designed properties stems from a neglect 
of both relational approaches to technology and affect. Regarding technology, diffusionist 
approaches (Rogers, 2003) are favoured that explain how discrete material objects circulate or 
not as their human designed properties interact with a social milieu of affectively charged 
cognitive expectations. These approaches disregard ANT studies suggesting technologies 
proliferate within transformative encounters, wherein new actors, human and non-human, are 
purposefully transformed as they are enrolled to support that technology, while that technology, 
and its design properties and uses, are adapted to sustain that support (Akrich et al. 2002; Locke 
and Lowe, 2007). ANT’s relational ontology tacitly thus suggests that human (and perhaps 
non-human) affects may also be transformed and enrolled within technologies. Relational 
theories of affect, including those influenced by Deleuzo-Spinozian thinking, are similarly 
overlooked. This scholarship explores how affects are not the sole possession of human minds 
but constituted within encounters between human and non-human bodies (Anderson, 2014; 
Deleuze, 1988; 1992; 2017; DeLanda, 2006; 2016; Hjorth and Holt, 2014; Michels and 
Stayaert, 2017) or even between exclusively non-human bodies (Ash, 2015). Taken together, 
these relational understandings of technology and affect offer novel opportunities to expand 
the significance of affect in analysing technologies in organisational life. In the next section 
we move to develop these opportunities by first explicating and then challenging the ostensive 
rationalism of ANT studies of technology.  
 
Rationalist ANT and beyond 
 
ANT explanations for the proliferation of seemingly discrete technological objects (e.g. mobile 
phones, cars) typically figure technologies as black boxes wherein the ‘inner workings’ of a 
technology are hidden from view and ‘we need to know nothing but its input and output’ 
(Latour., 1987: 3); thus the technology moves as ‘one unbreakable whole’ (Latour, 1987: 132). 
But this black boxing does not stem from a technology’s designed properties (as in Rogers, 
2003), rather it emerges from ongoing purposive processes of ‘translation’ (here called ‘actor-
networking’), where actors, human and non-human, and their explicit (rational) self-interests, 
are encountered, redefined, aligned, and enrolled, in support of a technology that is then 
adapted to uphold that support (Akrich et al. 2002). Technologies thus proliferate along ‘narrow 
and fragile networks’ (Latour, 1987: 232) that mirror their internalized, black boxed, relations. 
If the translation work fails to enrol an encountered new actor, or does not hold existing actors 
in stable alignment, the technology cannot travel, or will turn into something different (Law, 
2002: 93). According to Callon (1986), actor-networking consists of four transformative 
moments of translation: (i) problematization – the hypothetical definition of actors and their 
interests around a common problem and solution (‘obligatory passage point’); (ii) 
interessement – mechanisms used to impose the problematization upon actors, or their 
‘spokespeople’, including isolating them from opposing problematizations (or ‘counter-
enrolments’ – Callon and Law, 1982); for a range of these avowedly Machiavellian 
mechanisms see Latour (1987: 108-120); (iii) enrolment – the multilateral co-ordination of 
roles, and interests, within the network between the different parties; (iv) mobilization – the 
existence of a stable network of actors and a moveable and discrete black box. Later ANT work 
has revised technological actor-networking by emphasising fluidity, wherein enrolled actors 
and relations may be substituted, if sufficient overarching functionality endures within the 
network (De Laet and Mol, 2000; Law, 2002) – here technologies travel as adaptable ‘fluid’ 
objects rather than black boxes (cf. Lock and Lowe, 2007: 796).  
ANT challenges diffusion models underpinning extant studies of affect, innovation and 
technology by rejecting notions of humans as an affectively charged milieu of cognitive 
resistances to discrete technologies. Instead, societies and technologies, humans and non-
humans, are mutually transformed to allow technologies to proliferate. Yet, in most guises, 
ANT shares with diffusion studies a decidedly rationalist orientation: human network builders 
enrol heterogeneous actors to support a technology by prescribing, aligning and enrolling their 
rational self-interests in support of technology, or, equally rationally, they negotiate degrees of 
fluidity in actors and their relations, while insisting on some minimal functionality. ANT has 
consequently often been criticized for instilling a deadpan managerialism that neglects 
encounters with emergent events (Thrift, 2008: 112; Whittle and Spicer, 2008: 617), imagined 
futures (Bear, 2013: 24; Thrift, 2008: 113), and indeterminate, and lingering, affects (Lamprou, 
2017: 1744; Thrift, 2008: 113). Put simply ‘the focus of ANT is often on “what is required” 
and not “what is possible”’ (Bear, 2013: 24). However, although un-acknowledged within the 
above critical commentaries, some ANT technology studies have fleeting gestured to the 
organising role of human affects such as ‘love’ (Latour, 1996: 288) or ‘care’ (De Laet and Mol, 
2000: 235). For example, considering how network builders struggle to find reliable 
spokespeople in interessement, Akrich, Callon and Latour explain how ‘Doubt, trust, then 
gratitude and admiration, or on the contrary, suspicion, defiance and even hate, are at the heart 
of innovation’ (Akrich et al. 2002: 222). The above short glimpses of affect in ANT technology 
scholarship have been supplemented by two longer expositions that serve here as a bridgehead 
to move beyond the ostensive rationalism of ANT.  
 
The first of these is Latour’s (1999; 2004) concept of attachment. Latour (1999; 2004) proposes 
what ANT lacks is a concept to adequately specify the quality, rather than mere existence or 
not, of attachments between actors’ bodies. That is, ‘how one is affected’ (Latour, 1999: 22; 
emphasis added) by ‘objects, properties, fears, techniques that make us do things unto others’ 
(Latour, 1999: 25; emphasis added). Expounding the concept of attachment, Latour (1999) 
describes ‘good’ bodily attachments as ties between actors that ‘make existence possible’ (p29) 
while ‘bad’ attachments are those that ‘kill’ us (p30). Action is thus explainable through 
configurations of good and bad attachments rather than in analyses of enslaved attachment 
versus autonomous detachment (i.e. structure/agency) (Latour, 1999). Latour’s (1999; 2004) 
notion of attachment promises to address questions of affect usually unamenable to ANT 
analysis, including: how are actors affected to enrol and be enrolled in support a technology, 
or why and how do actors learn to become sensitive to new actors, and their affective longings, 
as well as their explicit interests? Latour’s answer to these questions is that ‘To understand the 
activity of subjects, their emotions, their passions, we must turn our attention to that which 
attaches and activates them’ (Latour, 1999: 27). Notwithstanding its appealing relational 
simplicity, two limitations persist that undermine the analytical potential of ‘attachment’ to 
develop an affective ANT. First, in his effort to displace dichotomies of attached structural 
determinism versus detached autonomous agency, Latour (1999) relies on what might be 
termed ‘networked happenstance’ to explain how new desires are serendipitously produced. 
This is usefully exampled with his account of the desire to stop smoking cigarettes: ‘I do not 
control it [the cigarette] any more than it controls me. I am attached to it, and if I cannot hope 
for any kind of emancipation from it, then perhaps other attachments will come to substitute 
for this one’ (Latour, 1999: 27; emphasis added). Secondly, while purposeful human capacities 
for ‘distinguishing those attachments that save from those that kill [e.g. cigarettes]’ (Latour, 
1999: 31) now appear crucial in understanding why processes of actor-networking are desired, 
Latour (1999) does not explain how such human capacities are produced.  
 
Recognizing these limitations, the geographers Müller and Schurr’s (2016) propose blending 
ANT with Deleuzo-Guattarian theories of affect and especially human desire (Deleuze and 
Guattari, 2004). This, they contend, will allow ANT to address unanswered questions regarding 
‘what brings actor-networks into being, makes them cohere or pulls them apart’ (Müller and 
Schurr (2016: 224) and avoid the sense of happenstance that inflects Latour’s (1999) reasoning. 
Müller and Schurr (2016) introduce their approach by stressing that Deleuzo-Guattarian human 
desire is neither subjectively possessed or a serendipitous network aftereffect (as with Latour, 
1999; 2004), rather it ‘becomes together with the assemblage [i.e. the actor-network of human 
and non-human bodies], not as a result of it’ (p224). Illustrated with an In-Vitro Fertilization 
(IVF) programme, they describe how multiple, disparate, human desires are relationally 
produced to ‘bind together human and non-human elements’ (Müller and Schurr (2016: 225) – 
facilitating the subsequent actor-networking of explicit, rational, interests. Although they do 
not quite express it this way, these desires are clearly produced in lived (including imagined) 
encounters between human and non-human bodies, from parents desiring children when 
viewing images of the ‘happy family’ to surrogates desiring to help distressed infertile couples. 
Müller and Schurr (2016) propose actor-networking ‘is unthinkable’ (p226) without this 
diffusive, quasi-autonomous, production of desire. We might agree, but they do not unpack 
how desire emerges within bodily encounters or how it relates to specific purposive processes 
of actor-networking. Moreover, it is difficult to discern the extent to which the production of 
such desire, or perhaps conditions for its emergence, might be purposeful – reintroducing the 
spectre of happenstance. There is much in Müller and Schurr’s (2016) cross-fertilization of 
ANT and Deleuzo-Guattarian thinking that inspires our proposals here but their approach lacks 
granularity in explaining how specific categories of affect, such as human desire, influence 
specific organising processes of actor-networking (e.g. enrolment) and how and why such 
purposive organising processes might themselves produce affects. This shortcoming in 
specifying relations between concepts limits its potential for informing empirical analyses 
(Fisher and Aguinis, 2017). For this reason, our own engagement with affect and ANT now 
proceeds to elaborate specific concepts and their relations in Deleuze’s reading of Spinoza’s 
affective philosophy (Deleuze, 1988; 1992; 2017), before then elaborating how these specific 
concepts relate to ANT, and processes of technological innovation, through our empirical 
example of zero-carbon housebuilding.    
 Actor-networking with affective bodies  
 
Gilles Deleuze’s readings of Spinoza (Deleuze, 1988; 1992; 2017) constitute arguably the 
strongest influence on his theorization of affect, including within his later collaborations with 
Félix Guattari (e.g. Deleuze and Guattari, 2004: 253-260). While Deleuzo-Guattarian 
philosophy is hardly new to organisation studies (e.g. Cooper and Burrell, 1988), Deleuzo-
Spinozian organisational studies remain relatively embryonic. Thus far, these studies largely 
consist of critical explorations of organisational politics (Carnera, 2012; Michels and Stayaert, 
2017; Pullen et al. 2017) and ethics (Thanem and Wallenberg, 2015), although studies of 
technology, creativity and innovation have been proposed (see Hjorth and Holt, 2014: 90-1). 
Given the novelty of our undertaking here, we will first elaborate some key tenets in Deleuzo-
Spinozian affective philosophy when thinking about technologies, and purposeful desires to 
innovate, before then developing our cross-fertilization with ANT.  
 
Deleuze explains affective bodies as the ontological building blocks of Spinozian philosophy. 
These bodies encompass all organised conglomerations of matter and energy, from stars, to 
mobile phones, to human beings, and are definable along two dimensions – their ‘constituent 
relations’ (Deleuze, 2017: 6): (i) ‘the relations of motion and rests, of speeds and slowness 
between particles’ and (ii) their ‘capacity for affecting and being affected’ (Deleuze, 1988: 
123). The speeds and slowness of ‘particles’ are capacities that enable bodies to connect: ‘it is 
by speed and slowness that one slips in among things that one connects with something else’ 
(Deleuze, 1988: 123). Speed is distinctive because, unlike other qualities like volume and 
length that only increase quantitatively, increasing speed effects qualitative changes in bodies 
when thresholds are reached, imbuing new connective potentials between bodies; for example, 
the speed shift in fluids from laminar to tubular flows creates new potentials for fluids to 
interact with other bodies (DeLanda, 2016: 76). The second dimension of affective bodies are 
capacities to affect and be affected by other bodies, within encounters, as well as specific 
‘variations or transformations’ in those affects, or their ‘thresholds’ (Deleuze, 1988: 125). In 
short, affects are changes in thresholds of potentials to act and be acted upon. And as ‘you do 
not know beforehand what a body or a mind can do, in a given encounter’ (Deleuze, 1988: 125) 
these changes are only knowable within bodily encounters.  
 
In what follows we redefine technologies, humans, and indeed all organised conglomerations 
of matter and energy, as affective bodies not ‘actors’ as with ANT. We then propose the verb 
‘actor-networking’ (not the noun ‘actor-network’) to refer to a particular set of purposeful 
processes of translation (Callon, 1986) that can help explore how such affective bodies are 
organised and proliferate. In order to elaborate the analytical advantages of this Deleuzo-
Spinozian reframing of the ontological foundations of ANT to explore the organised 
proliferation of technologies, it is useful to first compare Deleuzo-Spinozian affective bodies 
with ANT actors. Some similarities are evident. As with the infinite regress of ANT, affective 
bodies are composed from more affective bodies ad infinitum (Deleuze, 2017: 10). Affective 
bodies and actors are also constituted by heterogeneous agencies, encompassing designed 
material artefacts, animals, humans, even, as we will discuss shortly, ‘a current of air’ (Deleuze, 
2017: 19). But affective bodies differ in two important respects. First, affective bodies are 
defined by their future capacities for action as well as their present abilities. That is, affective 
bodies are also constituted by what they can become and can do formed from distinctive bodily 
speeds, affects and encounters with other affective bodies, while ANT actors are typically only 
defined only by what actors are and what they are doing, as given from their more or less 
tightly enrolled agencies and components (DeLanda, 2006: 11). Second, Deleuze’s theorization 
of affective bodies suggests the usefulness of an analytically, if not ontologically (Ash, 2015: 
86), distinct category of human affects including desires. This notion breaches ANT’s 
customary prohibition on registering a priori differences between humans and non-humans 
(Callon, 1986). Our wager is that these two conceptual shifts can significantly help in exploring 
the affective conditions that enable purposeful actor-networking, and then how ANT concepts 
can inform Deleuzo-Spinozian analysis of the purposeful organisation of affect. To develop 
this line of thinking it is necessary to first explain more about the range of specifically human 
affects, how they are produced, and their involvement in the organisation of bodies, such as 
technologies.   
 
Understanding human affects with Deleuze requires an expansion of our above definition of 
affective bodies to be ‘taken in its broadest sense [so as] to include “mental” or ideal bodies’ 
(Massumi, in Deleuze and Guattari, 2004: xvi). This is crucial because conceptualizing human 
bodies and their affects, unlike the technical affects produced between exclusively non-human 
bodies (e.g. the capacity of a key to open a lock and the capacity of a lock to be opened by a 
key – Ash, 2015: 87), involves addressing encounters that are also imagined within 
representational ideas and language, as well those that are materially present in the here and 
now. Despite sentiments to the contrary (notably Thrift, 2008), Deleuzo-Spinozian thinking 
does not support an exclusively ‘non-representational’ understanding of human affects. This is 
because, as Deleuze (2017) explains, while all human affects can be defined as ‘non-
representational’ (p1) thoughts, they are always already ‘enveloped’ (p17), and indeed 
triggered by, representational ideas and language. Understanding the interplay between non-
representational affect and representational ideas is critical to not fall back on Latourian notions 
of relational happenstance (Latour, 1999; Müller and Schurr, 2016) in the production of human 
desires and agencies to create new bodies, like technologies.  
 
Deleuze’s explains the relation between representational ideas and non-representational affects 
with reference to two inescapable aspects of human life: first, ‘my body never stops 
encountering bodies.’ (Deleuze, 2017: 20); and second, these encounters are always manifest 
to us as representational ideas: ‘one idea chases another, one idea replaces another’ (Deleuze, 
2017: 3). For Deleuze, as we encounter other bodies, whether in the here and now or as ideas 
in our imagination, they are always presented to us within our minds as representational ideas: 
a planned holiday, feeling tired, a meeting we had yesterday, a fly on the wall, and so on. The 
simplest, and most prevalent, type of these ideas are those that relate solely to the effect (not 
affect) of one body mixing with our own; these ideas are called affections (affectio) as distinct 
from affect (affectus) (Deleuze, 2017: 4). Affections are the most confused, least reasoned of 
ideas: ‘affection-ideas are representations of effects without their causes, and it’s precisely 
these that Spinoza calls inadequate ideas’ (Deleuze, 2017: 5). That is, two bodies encounter 
each other and mix and we then represent an idea of that effect, for example: ‘“I feel the sun 
on me”’ (see Deleuze, 2017: 4) or “what is that noise – it’s a fly” or, more imaginatively, 
“thinking about that holiday I had makes me feel good”, “that meeting yesterday was so dull!”. 
But crucially we do not know how or why we feel, or experience, this or that effect – these 
ideas are highly serendipitous, imaginative, and experimental, not determined, reasoned, or 
knowledgeable (Deleuze, 1992: 220). When we pass from what we feel is an agreeable idea 
(e.g. planned holiday) to one that is disagreeable (e.g. how tired we feel) this passage to 
disagreeability can be understood as a diminishing of our power of acting (Deleuze, 2017: 5). 
This diminishment means our constituent relations (our connective speeds and capacities to 
affect and be affected) become increasingly invested in trying to ward off, in this case, the 
feeling of tiredness, so that our total power of acting is reduced (Deleuze, 2017: 8). If instead 
we pass from thinking about feeling tired to a planned holiday this may increase our power of 
acting – ‘bodies are mixed with you in proportions and under conditions which are favourable 
to your [constituent] relation’ (Deleuze, 2017: 8). The passage in the diminishment of our 
power of acting, is sadness, while joy corresponds with an agreeable passage – an increase in 
our power of acting (Deleuze, 1988; 1992; 2017). Affect (affectus) is thus defined as a non-
representational thought (Deleuze, 2017: 1) corresponding to the constant modulation in our 
power of acting, as we are affected by other bodies, while affection (affectio) refers to the 
enveloping representational ideas that (with other types of ideas) effect this variation. But one 
is never reducible to the other: ‘affect is not reducible to an intellectual comparison of 
[affection] ideas, affect is constituted by the lived transition or lived passage from one degree 
of perfection to another’ (Deleuze, 2017: 4). ‘Perfection’ refers here to the increase or decrease 
in our power to act with our constituent relations – hence power of acting is also discussed in 
terms of ‘force of existing … it’s what we call existing’ (Deleuze, 2017: 4).  
 
Equipped with this relational concept of human affect as the product of open-ended encounters 
between tangible and ideational bodies we can employ it to conceptualize how human desires 
to actor-network – to, for example, proliferate a technology are produced. And importantly, we 
can now do so without evoking networked happenstance (Latour, 1999; 2004), while also 
explaining the emergence of the desire to differentiate between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ attachments 
(Latour, 1999). Such desires are now to be understood as the will (conatus) to ‘persevere in 
existing’ (Deleuze, 1988: 98) by cultivating joyful (or in Latourian terms ‘good’) encounters 
with bodies that affirm our force of existing, and warding off, transforming and destroying sad 
(or ‘bad’) encounters (Deleuze, 1992: 243). All bodies, from stars to frogs to cars, possess this 
striving to endure by affirming encounters that create thresholds for existence as is self-evident 
by their enduring organised existence (Ash, 2015; DeLanda, 2006; 2016). However, humans 
(and some non-human animals) are unique in being able to become reflexively aware of how 
entering into relations with another body in an encounter affirms diminishes their constituent 
relations (Deleuze, 2017: 5). This knowledge then constitutes our active desires. But crucially, 
this actively purposeful desire is only produced when the mind can determine from an 
encounter between bodies not simply that affects have modulated joyfully or not in the ebb and 
flow of affection-ideas, but their common effects and causes. This transition into knowing the 
cause of an affect is termed a ‘common notion’ (Deleuze, 1988; 1992). Here our mind arrives 
at ‘an idea which, instead of representing the effect of a body on another, that is to say the 
mixture of two bodies [as in affection-ideas], represents the internal agreement or disagreement 
of the characteristic [or constitutive] relations of the two bodies (Deleuze, 2017: 9). Common 
notions also themselves produce affects (joy, sadness, desire) but these affects are understood 
as active, not passive, in that the passage to positive affect stems not from the passive flow of 
affection-ideas and chance encounters, but from the flow of adequate ideas produced by our 
mind of the cause of the relation between bodies: we thus become in ‘full possession of our 
power of action’ (Deleuze, 1992: 280). Deleuze (2017) goes on to explain how common 
notions can be universal and less locally useful (e.g. Spinoza’s common notion that all bodies 
vary in capacities of speed) or more local and useful (e.g. two automotive designers meet and 
recognize they share a passive joy in thinking about an electric car that may render that joy 
active, creating active desires and actions to collaborate to build one). It is also important to 
note why active desires can only form through encounters that envelope joyful affects. The 
reason for this is that: ‘As long as you have a sad affect, a body acts on yours, a soul acts on 
yours in conditions and in a relation which do not agree with yours. At that point, nothing in 
sadness can induce you to form the common notion, that is to say the idea of a something in 
common between two bodies and two souls’ (Deleuze, 2017: 10; see also Deleuze, 1992: 282-
3).  
 
This Deleuzo-Spinozian exposition of affect dovetails with ANT in two respects. First, by 
figuring the formation of active desires through common notions, the disparate desires of actors 
to enrol and be enrolled in support of a technological innovation, as in the IVF programme 
described in Müller and Schurr (2016: 225), can be said to only form under certain affective 
conditions: (i) certain capacities, or thresholds, of speed that allow particles, and bodies, to 
mix; (ii) a passive release of joyful affects between mixed bodies enveloped by increasingly 
agreeable affection-ideas; and (iii) ideas of the common effects and causes of those affects 
within that bodily encounter (as in common notions) – giving rise to active desires and thus 
purposive action. We propose the term enrolment affects to describe affects enveloped when 
bodily encounters fulfil these conditions and unfamiliar bodies can be enrolled within existing 
technological bodies and new ones created. And secondly, sad affects appear equally salient to 
actor-networking. Sad affects, such as ‘hate … antipathy, derision, contempt, envy, anger and 
so on’ (Deleuze, 1992: 243), appear valuable to network builders seeking to instil enrolled 
bodies obedience to their allocated roles in an actor-network within the moment of 
interessement (Callon, 1986). This is because they curtail the capacity of affective bodies, once 
enrolled in support of a given technology, to possess their power of acting. That is, they prevent 
affective bodies from forming new common notions and active desires not commensurate with 
previous problematizations as they encounter new bodies. Or, as Deleuze (2017) puts it: 
‘Inspiring sad passions is necessary for the exercise of power’ (p4).  These sad affects are here 
termed obedience affects. In the remainder of the paper we further elaborate and specify these 
two ‘bridging concepts’ between ANT and Deleuzo-Spinozian thinking with our example of 
zero-carbon housebuilding technology.  
 Affective actor-networking (or what Deleuzo-Spinozian affect theory can do for ANT) 
 
We begin our empirical elaboration of affective ANT by discussing enrolment affects across a 
brief encounter on a zero-carbon housebuilding project in the English Midlands – here named 
Ecoville. For our purposes this encounter involved three main bodies (and their components): 
an assistant site manager, here named Brian, the second author of this paper, and a (soon to be 
insulated) light switch. The successful enrolment of the (insulated) light switch within zero-
carbon housebuilding technology was valuable to allow the Zero-Carbon Homes (ZCHs) on 
this site to pass the airtightness testing, as required to evidence government imposed definitions 
of ‘zero-carbon’ standards to meet wider sustainability targets (ZCH, 2017). Only by achieving 
these airtightness standards would the then government be able meet its target to help firms 
roll out ZCH technology across the UK housebuilding industry. The following encounter took 
place on a cold November day in 2015 in a half built living room of a four-bedroom detached 
house as Brian inspected a light fitting:  
 
Brian: What you’d do is generally, the rule of thumb, a light switch goes up, sockets, run down. 
So that should be sealed, again when you do, put your full dab on an external wall, your 
full dab of plaster should seal that, stop any airflow like that [Feels around recently 
finished light switch to indicate the presence of cool air, then nods].  And what we do 
on the, on here, on a [ZCH], when we put the trunking on, on top of the cables, we 
would then air tape say 150 mil down again, and then that would seal onto that as well, 
just to stop any …   
 
Researcher: So that the [cooler] air doesn’t run up, along? 
 
Brian:  That’s right because, believe it or not … you won’t  believe how much air escapes 
through an electrical socket … They weren’t doing it until I come here, and it, but I’ve 
changed the system [the method statement] and now the, we, with the air test results 
[for the ZCH standards] are better and they’re sailing through. 
 
To start to elaborate affective ANT we can first analyse this encounter with ANT alone. We 
might begin by determining how Brian encountered an emergent actor, the ‘leaky’ light switch, 
whose ‘interest’ (‘interest’ in ANT can refer to non-humans – Callon, 1986) in releasing cold 
air was disrupting the enrolment of other actors (e.g. planning approval officials, air tightness 
testers) to support the spread of ZCH technology into Ecoville. Consequently, Brian isolates 
the light switch from its disruptive interest, or counter-enrolment (Callon and Latour, 1982), 
by enrolling a new ‘interessement device’ – insulating air tape – in the method statement for 
constructing the ZCH (the air tape being a black boxed actor that is easy to enrol as it is already 
interested in preventing cold air loss). The leaky light switch is thus successfully enrolled by 
being translated in the ZCH actor-network into an insulated light switch. And ZCH technology 
is transformed too – it now possess new tangible properties and abilities as evidenced within 
the airtightness testing. All that was required to stabilize ZCH technology and allow it to 
proliferate elsewhere at Ecoville, and beyond, is described here, but there is less consideration 
of why it was possible (Bear, 2013; Müller and Schurr, 2016). What is missing from this 
analysis is how the specific bodies involved (i.e. Brian, the light switch, and their constituent 
parts – hands, leaking air, and so on) combined to produce this outcome; that is, what might 
have produced this desire for Brian, not others, to become sensitive to the leaky light switch 
and enrol the air tape? And also, importantly, why, once enrolled, might other human actors 
desire to comply with this translation? We will explore the first question within this section. 
While the second, which concerns our second research question around how affects might be 
targeted to serve managerial ends, is examined in the following section.  
 
To illustrate how Deleuzo-Spinozian concepts of affect extend ANT we can return to two initial 
conditions Deleuze (1988; 1992; 2017) suggests have to be met for Brian to possess the 
capacity to enrol the leaky light switch. First, Brian’s hands and the cool air from the light 
switch had to have the capacity to move and rest to connect. If perhaps Brian was running late 
on inspecting the previous house, and he had been rushing this building inspection, his hands 
or thoughts may move too fast, or if the air molecules had already been heated on a summer 
day and they had moved more quickly, bodily connections (i.e. the detection of relatively cooler 
air around the small gaps around the light switch by a slow moving hand) would not have 
occurred. Second, Brian must have then formed inadequate affection-ideas concerning the 
effect of another body on his (e.g. “my hand is cool”, “where is that coming from?”, “what is 
that – it’s gone now, back again”, “It could be coming from X or Y”).  As Brian indicates, we 
might then determine that when previous colleagues encountered ‘unruly’ technologies like 
light switches this would typically trigger a run of thoughts along the lines of: “what’s that?”, 
“where is that coming from?”, “that’s probably nothing”, “better not tell anyone”, “that should 
be ok”, “hopefully that’ll be fine”. Such uncertain affection ideas envelope what we can read 
with Deleuze and Spinoza as an oscillation between hope/fear, between joyful/sad affects. 
Spinoza explains how hope and fear correspond with ‘ideas of a future or past thing whose 
outcome [for respective affective joy or sadness] we to some extent doubt’ (Spinoza, 1996: 
106). 
 
And yet, for Brian, his bodily mixing with the leaky light switch did more than oscillate 
fear/hope – it enveloped a constant passage of joyful affect wherein the constituent relations of 
Brian and the light switch resonated to produce something new (rather than destroying each 
other): the insulated light switch. As Deleuze (2017) explains, the strongest evidence of joyful 
affect, and interconnected bodily speeds, is that two bodies create a new body, as in a new 
affective composition and its unique speeds: ‘when the relations are composed, the two things 
of which the relations are composed, form a superior individual, a third individual which 
encompasses and takes them as parts’ (Deleuze, 2017: 21). Ultimately this new body was the 
insulated light switch and its new connective speeds and ‘technical affects’ (Ash, 2015) to be 
insulated, and to insulate as added to the ZCH – creating, in turn, new affective capacities for 
ZCH technology to spread across the firm and UK housing industry. But new technical bodies 
and affects initially require a passive human joy that enables the resonance of constituent 
relations between bodies (Deleuze, 1992: 285). We can elaborate how such passive joy is 
assembled with a further comment by Brian reflecting on how he identified the leaky light 
switch: 
 
 … you know from experience, you know that’s where the air goes through … if 
 that’s your external wall there and there’s your brickwork coming down there, if 
 somebody misses an area of insulation out of here, then that will be a cool spot, won’t 
 it? (Brian, Assistant Site Manager, ‘Ecoville’). 
 
This explanation suggests that Brian’s ‘geo-historicity’ (Anderson, 2014: 92) of encounters 
with similarly leaky objects helped him form joyous, not sad, affects. While Deleuze (1988; 
1992; 2017) does not discuss affective memory in detail, Spinoza (1996: 79-80) proposes that 
as any passage of (inadequate) affection-ideas progresses with enveloping passive affects such 
as hope and fear, past and future bodies, are imaginatively added to the present encounter on 
the basis of their affective similarity. We propose ‘affective memory’ as a useful conceptual 
addition to Deleuzo-Spinozian thinking to explain how distal (imagined) and proximal 
(embodied) bodily encounters intertwine, allowing, in our example, Brian’s escape from the 
oscillation of fear/hope he suggests in his colleagues. We might hypothesize Brian’s run of 
affection-ideas was interjected by past encounters thus: “what’s that?”, “where is that coming 
from?” “That’s probably nothing”, “But I feel like I’ve seen something like this before?”, 
“What did we do then?”, “What can I do now?”, “We dealt with it then and I think it could 
work now”. The movement to other bodily encounters, the affective force of our hypothesized 
“But”, intensifies the existing feeling of hope over fear: joyful encounters with bodies from the 
past effectively leverage joyful encounters in the future. But Brian’s joy, and desire, still 
remains passive at this stage as it is still generated by chance encounters with a flow of bodies 
not his own ideas; he remains separated from his power of acting (Deleuze, 2017).  
 
Having already encountered similarly leaky bodies elsewhere, and resolved to enrol air tape or 
a similar insulating body, Brian appears predisposed to being positively, not negatively, 
affected in the encounter above with the leaky light switch. But more than this, in our encounter 
with Brian he appeared to lack any doubt about his actions – hope had been replaced by 
‘confidence … a joy born of the idea of a future or past thing, concerning which the cause of 
doubting has been removed’ (Spinoza, 1996: 106). Brian had now formed a common notion, 
an adequate idea: he understood that the constituent relations of several bodies – the air tests, 
ZCH technology, the light switch, Brian, air tape, trunking – shared a capacity (not) to insulate 
and (not) be insulated. Tellingly, this common notion was explicitly expressed by Brian as 
reasoned knowledge not confused ideas, as in ‘you know that’s where the air goes through’ 
(emphasis added). As Brian encountered this common notion, it enveloped an active 
confidence in him (not a passive hopefulness). Equipped with confidence and adequate ideas, 
Brian could reflect on the joyous form of his idea: the idea, not the chance bodily encounter, 
became the cause of his joy (Deleuze, 1992: 284). Brian now possessed not simply the 
knowledge to enrol the light switch but his power of acting. But our affective ANT approach 
suggests that while Brian’s active confidence proceeded from the removal of doubt, it 
necessarily requires an initial fear/hope similar to that which he ascribes to past colleagues. 
Spinoza (1996) explains that the removal of doubt occurs either because ‘man [sic] imagines 
the past or future thing is there [without doubt] … or ‘he imagines other things [i.e. the air 
tape], excluding the existence of the things which put him in doubt’ (p107). The leaky light 
switch was translated into an insulated light switch not simply because air tape was required, 
as rationalist ANT has it, but because it was possible for Brian to act within a series of 
interwoven encounters with distal and proximal bodies – encounters which resonated joyfully 
across space and time. Once Brian’s active desire for purposive actor-networking, for 
enrolment, was assembled, ZCH technology possessed new capacities to proliferate.  
 
Actor-networking affect (or what ANT can do for Deleuzo-Spinozian affect theory)  
 
Affective ANT helps render visible the affective conditions for actor-networking. What is less 
amenable to Deleuzo-Spinozian affect theory alone, however, is how managers might 
purposefully enrol bodily capacities, speeds and encounters, as well as actors’ rational interests 
within a technology, and thus enact its proliferation. The salience of this question becomes 
clear if we hypothesize a counter-enrolment (Callon and Law, 1982) at Ecoville: the possibility 
that Brian was unable to enrol his site manager in support of the use of air tape because his site 
manager was already enrolled in a far cheaper and more readily practised solution to enrol the 
leaky light switch – sealing air gaps with expanding foam. The issue here is that foam quickly 
degrades. The ZCH might travel as it passes its airtightness test but it will not travel beyond a 
few years as warm air is lost and (unknown to the home owners) increasing amounts of carbon 
are released by the thermostatically controlled boiler. Why did Brian’s site manager, Peter, not 
desire this alternative option, this counter-enrolment? The answer at Ecoville was Peter was 
already affected by pride: ‘He’s a NHBC [National House Building Council] award winning 
site manager. So he really does go that extra mile […] he’s a very proud man’ (Regional project 
manager). Peter had received numerous NHBC ‘Pride in the Job’ awards as displayed within 
his site office, and, as the regional project manager explained, Peter was actively recruited to 
this project due to his pride in innovating.  
 
The purposive assembly of a version of pride at Ecoville helps us elaborate how classic ANT 
concepts can be reworked to understand how bodily capacities, speeds, and encounters are 
acted upon to ‘shape what a body can do in a given situation’ (Anderson, 2014: 93). That is, 
fear, hope and confidence do not simply emerge organically by happenstance under given geo-
historical conditions, rather those affects are always already mediated, though never 
determined, by other affects, like pride, that are purposefully assembled, rendered knowable 
and actionable (Anderson, 2014: 92). Such affective interventions draw together relations 
between actors to attach specific versions of affects, like pride, not just to other bodily 
encounters, speeds and other affects, but rational interests and agendas including those of senior 
managers and policymakers – purposefully creating conditions that create capacities, never 
determinations, for specific bodily actions to take shape. To be clear, bodily capacities can 
never be fully determined as they remain partly excessive to any encounter (Deleuze, 1988: 
125) but this does not mean that managers do not try to work on and through affective bodily 
capacities with techniques of power.   
 
We propose it is highly productive to analyse such managerial interventions by reworking 
classic ANT concepts, such as Callon’s (1986) four moments of translation. At Ecoville ‘pride’ 
was partly rationally problematized by the NHBC as a shared solution, or ‘obligatory passage 
point’, to help to avoid ‘sub-standard building practices’ (NHBC, 2017b: 7) through ‘the 
celebration and sharing of best practice. Site managers that win an [‘Pride in the Job’] award 
are creating houses of an outstandingly high standard’ (NHBC, 2017b: 2). This 
problematization hypothesizes the rational self-interests of various actors to be enrolled in 
support of this version of pride: site managers interested in having their success recognized for 
career development; housebuilding firms interested in boosting their reputation; and 
homeowners interested in a high quality products (NHBC, 2017c: 1). But the problematization 
of such affects does not only proceed through the rational self-interests of actors, but also their 
future bodily encounters, speeds and capacities. In the NHBC Marking Guidelines, for 
example, ‘Pride in the Job’ is defined across hypothesized bodily encounters between eight 
building elements (foundations, sub-structure, superstructure, roofs, first fix, second fix, 
surface finishes, external work) and five aspects of work organisation (health and safety, 
planning, protection of work, site tidiness and personal impact) (NHBC, 2017). Pride in the 
foundations is defined as: 
  
… attention to detail of concrete placement in readiness for the masonry or frame, 
leaving a smooth, level surface. Accuracy, squareness, cleanliness and the build 
quality of both the concrete and the steel reinforcement cages. Care taken with the 
setting up of cages within the trench and the support system. Particular attention 
given to cleanliness of working areas around the foundation sides (NHBC, 2017a; 
emphasis added) 
 
Pride is problematized here in a way remarkably consistent with Deleuzo-Spinozian affective 
thinking: the NHBC criteria renders pride knowable not only in terms of explicit rational self-
interests in the present but imagined past/future encounters between human and non-human 
bodies and their interacting capacities to affect and be affected. If, for example, concrete 
foundations are affected with smoothing and levelling by encounters with human bodies, 
poured concrete and other tools, they can, in turn, assemble certain technical affects to support 
walls and so on. But more than this, by identifying human ‘care’ and ‘detail’ in these 
encounters, this problematization of pride also targets the capacities of human bodies for speed 
and rest. Pride is said to be recognizable in the capacities of site managers to slow down their 
hands and thoughts and connect with ‘detail’ and ‘care’ with the affective capacities of certain 
non-human bodies, such as leaky light switches.  
 
Following on from this moment of affective problematization, site managers must become 
interested and enrolled in support of the hypothetical version of (their) pride. Again, our 
example suggest this interessement process is both rational and affective. Site managers’ 
rational interests are readily enrolled: the NHBC is the largest supplier of UK building 
warranties; in the UK these warranties are obligatory for mortgage lending on new homes – all 
site managers (and only site managers) working on NHBC warranted homes are thus 
automatically enrolled to be evaluated for the pride awards within the building warranty 
inspection. But this hardly explains why site managers would be interested to desire to win an 
award (or display them). To affectively, not merely effectively, enrol site managers’ in support 
of this version of (their) pride, involves working upon human bodily encounters, speeds and 
affects. We can explore how this occurs with the following recollection of how a past winner 
of an NHBC ‘Pride in the Job’ felt when his name was called out at the award ceremony: 
 
 Sometime in everyone's life you get that split second, that rush, and winning a 
 Pride in the Job Award gave me that exact feeling … You've got to keep ahead of the 
 field. The competition is fierce but the rewards are great I'm always anxious when the 
 judges arrive on site because they turn up unannounced, but in fact I'm happy for them 
 to see my site at any time. It's always run as if a Pride in the Job judge was about to 
 arrive (Housebuilder, 2017). 
 
This account was used by the NHBC to market their awards, seemingly to inspire a passage of 
joyful affect in potential winners (“that rush … that split second …”), whereby the force of 
existing, or power of acting, of prospective winners was augmented relative to others (“You’ve 
got to keep ahead of the field”). What is less obvious here is how pride renders actors obedient 
to managerial ends. That is, if positive affects inspire our powers of acting, as Deleuze (2017) 
explains, how can pride, a seemingly positive affect, also inspire obedience to others?  To 
understand how it is useful to revisit Spinoza’s definition of pride as:  
 
 When the imagination concerns the man himself who thinks more highly of himself 
 than is just, it is called pride, and is a species of madness, because the man 
 dreams, with open eyes, that he can do all those things which he achieves only in his 
 imagination real and triumphs in, so long as he cannot imagine those things which 
 exclude the existence [of these achievements] and determine his power of acting 
 (Spinoza, 1996: 83-4).  
 
What Spinoza is suggesting here is that pride, unlike say confidence, is a peculiar joy to the 
extent that it cannot inspire active desires. This is because pride is produced within passages 
of both joyful and sad affects. Pride is certainly composed partly of passive affects of joy 
produced by ideas related to an aggrandized sense of our power of acting (“that rush … that 
split second … that exact feeling…”) but this passage is not produced by a common notion of 
our connections with others. Instead, pride involves denying ‘those things … that determine 
his power of acting’ (Spinoza, 1996: 84) – for example a site manager denying their reliance 
on good colleagues, favourable weather conditions, sheer luck, corporate and governmental 
policies, etc. Moreover, for Spinoza, pride also involves a passive affect of sadness, namely 
envy, produced by a flow of competitive ideas related to the achievements of others (“You’ve 
got to keep ahead of the field”). This envy inspires negative desire, or hate: ‘the proud man 
must be envious and hate those most who are praised’ (Spinoza, 1996: 145). When reading 
accounts from past winners, prospective winners may be inspired to feel pride but they cannot 
form common notions, and thus active desires that allow them to possess their power of acting. 
The reason for this is that by being enrolled in this vainglorious version of their pride, site 
managers necessarily cannot form common ideas of the shared effects and causes of their 
constituent relations with certain others, especially their human colleagues, and so they cannot 
become the adequate cause of their own joy and possess their power of acting (Deleuze, 1988; 
1992; 2017). Indeed, award winning site managers are explicitly conceived as unable to 
adequately know their relations with other humans: ‘They must … demonstrate excellent 
leadership, technical expertise, robust health and safety processes and a certain ‘X’ factor to 
set them apart from the competition’ (NHBC New Homes, 2016; emphasis added). 
 
These examples help us elaborate why affective interventions in and through pride are 
especially beneficial in the UK housebuilding industry as they encompass both enrolment and 
obedience affects. Regarding enrolment, pride is knowable through the NHBC Marking 
Guidelines as a higher degree of ‘attention to detail’ and ‘care’ within future bodily encounters, 
producing new technologies and their affects (e.g. insulated light switches). As discussed in 
the previous section, this dimension of pride can help slow the speeds of bodies, creating 
conditions to release passive affects (e.g. hope/fear), and some active positive affects and 
desires (confidence) – helping managers enrol unruly non-human bodies, like leaky light 
switches. But this version of pride also operates as a technique of power to inspire obedience 
to remain enrolled within the technological innovation strategies of senior managers. The 
cultivation of obedience proceeds through the purposeful circulation of two sets of encounters. 
One set is more imaginative: the Marking Guidelines prescribe imagined encounters and 
transformations with material objects (as in the attention to detail and care with future 
foundations), under the auspices of ‘Pride in the Job’; yet encounters and transformations with 
other related imagined bodies are excluded, in particular corporate innovation policies, and 
decisions, and even the criteria of ‘Pride in the Job’ award itself. The second set of encounters 
are more tangible: the staging of ‘flattering encounters’ (Spinoza, 1996: 145) through the 
circulation of certain bodies (e.g. award ceremonies, award certificates, and articles about 
awards), site managers can be gripped in the pursuit of a vainglorious joy as they are invited to 
downplay the contributions of their own colleagues and envy the achievements of their peers 
elsewhere. Such atomizing encounters do not fulfil the affective conditions necessary for site 
managers to form expansive common notions of their constitutive relations with other bodies 
(site managers, colleagues, distant sites and technologies, corporate and governmental policies, 
other affects etc.), within their firm or beyond. They cannot therefore possess their power of 
acting, and pursue radical problematizations and counter-enrolments of corporate strategies 
and decisions – even perhaps to challenge the existence of a technology such as a ZCH. In 
other words, if the circulation of enrolment affects constitutes a centrifugal force, allowing 
humans to connect with and create new technological bodies, obedience affects constitute a 
centripetal force forestalling and centring that process on a purposeful, managerially mandated, 
interests and agendas.  
 
Concluding discussion  
 
Our proposals for an affective ANT suggests relationally constituted human affects do more 
than prompt actors to adopt or reject, or use or not use, discrete technological objects 
(Chaudhuri et al. 2010; Choi et al. 2011; Lamprou, 2017; Wood and Moreau, 2006). Instead, 
human affects (re)constitute technologies. The hope, confidence, envy, hate and pride, that 
circulated at Ecoville, engendered conditions conducive for the enrolment, and thus 
proliferation, of some non-human bodies (insulated light switches) as part of the ZCH, while 
perhaps delimiting the capacity of others to be enrolled and proliferate (e.g. expanding foam). 
Human affects, and the technological bodies they gather together and transform, in turn modify 
‘technical affects’ (Ash, 2015) – creating new thresholds for technologies to act and be acted 
upon as they circulate (e.g. new capacities for houses to insulate and be insulated) and new 
tipping points where those thresholds can be transformed or broken down.  
 
In elaborating the interplay of human and technical affects, affective ANT also suggests how 
the circulation of new technologies involves the circulation of new technical affects that shape 
materially inscribed organisational norms of action and meaning (Joerges and Czarniawka, 
1998; Spicer, 2005). For example, following Ecoville, new thresholds to insulate with air tape 
can allow new definitions of the components of a ‘zero-carbon home’ to be circulated across 
the UK housebuilding industry, perhaps shaping new working patterns and identities. 
Although, as Ash (2015) explains, such technical affects are never reducible to their designed 
intent as ‘material components and thresholds can be reworked, modified or simply broken 
down, which in turn generates a whole new set of thresholds within which affects can operate’ 
(p87). More research is required to explore the organisation, circulation and transformation of 
such ‘technical affects’ (Ash, 2015) in prescribing, proscribing and transforming such 
organisational norms of action and meaning. Our specific contribution here has been to 
highlight the role of humans in producing such technical affects. Typically, human agency in 
organisational studies of technologies is either employed to critique technological determinism 
(Orlikowski and Barley, 2001), or downplayed within socio-material notions of ‘relational’ or 
‘symmetrical’ action (e.g. Locke and Lowe, 2007; Harrison and Laberge, 2002). Affective 
ANT differs by prefiguring human agency as distinctive in enabling technological bodies to 
proliferate through ongoing transformations of their technical affects. But, somewhat 
paradoxically, such agency is not attributable in advance to humans (as suggested by Fitzgerald 
et al. 2002; Hung, 2004; Korica and Molloy 2010) or the product of happenstance within a 
network of shifting relations (Cochory, 2009; Latour, 1999; Locke and Lowe, 2007).  Rather, 
human bodies are said to only possess their agency to enrol together human and non-human 
bodies, and circulate new technical affects – or, simply put, to innovate – when encounters 
fulfil specific conditions: connective speeds that allow bodies (distal and proximal) to mix; the 
passive release of joyful affects; and (common) ideas of the shared bodily effects and causes 
of those affects. The purposive enrolment of new bodies within a technological object, and the 
creation of new technical affects, may be locally necessary for technologies, like ZCHs to form 
transformative connections with new bodies (e.g. insulated light switches), but it can also 
radically transform the intended purpose, or ‘problematization’ (Callon, 1986), of a 
technological object – even perhaps destroying it (Latour, 1996). This is why, as with our 
example of ‘Pride in the Job’ award winning site managers, inspiring encounters to 
counterbalance the inspiration of creative enrolment affects with obedience affects that instil 
compliance to extant innovation strategies becomes a central managerial task.  
 
By directly exploring managerial interventions into the affective life of organisations our 
approach thus also informs Deleuzo-Spinozian studies on organisation and affect. Most 
importantly, our analysis highlights the significant interplay of joyful and sad affects in the 
survival of bodies. This idea, which follows as much from our cross-fertilization of Deleuzo-
Spinozian affect theory with ANT as from our empirical case, runs somewhat counter to 
Deleuze’s (1988; 1992; 2017) reading of Spinoza and extant Deleuzo-Spinozian organisational 
studies. That is, in these treatments of affect, the survival of bodies is strongly associated with 
their capacity to develop joyful, transformative, encounters with other bodies (e.g. Carnera, 
2012: 82; Deleuze, 1992: 243; Hjorth and Holt, 2014: 84-88; Thanem and Wallenberg, 2015: 
241). In contrast, in our analysis, capacities to forestall transformative connections between 
bodies, to block the emergence of new bodies, to allow bodily connections to disconnect, even 
if temporally short-lived and spatially localized, appear equally essential to their survival. 
However, within Deleuzo-Spinozian organisation studies, and beyond (Anderson, 2014: 16-
17), the term ‘affect’ has almost become a synonym for joyful affect: the open-ended 
transformation of life to countermand ‘order’ (Hjorth and Holt, 2014: 92), ‘moralism’ (Carnera, 
2012: 82), ‘organizational authoritarianism’ (Thanem and Wallenberg, 2015: 248), domination 
(Michels and Stayaert, 2017: 100) and ‘gendered organization’ (Pullen et al. 2017: 115) – in 
short, against oppressive management.    
 
For us, this joyful treatment of affect, no matter how seductive when figured against the 
perceived deadness of organisations, is problematic in two respects. Firstly, ontologically, as it 
underplays the role of sad affects in the endurance of all bodies, even radical ones. And 
secondly politico-ethically, as it prefigures negative and positive affects as respectively 
reproducing and challenging relations of power. In our study the important cuts to explore 
relations of power did not concern abstracted distinctions between positive and negative affect. 
Rather they concerned distinctions rendered within managerial interventions into affective life, 
as in the ‘Pride in the Job’ award, where affects like pride circulated to attach some bodies 
within transformative connections with hope and care (e.g. hands and light switches), while 
disconnecting others through envy and hate (e.g. site managers and their colleagues). By 
mapping such affective interventions – and the specific affects and bodily connections and 
disconnections they assemble – their role in sustaining and transforming certain bodies over 
others can be better understood and so perhaps critically reworked. But even in this 
refashioning process, sad obedience affects play a vital role. After all, even radical bodies, such 
as Spinoza’s concepts, can only endure into the twenty first century, and transform new bodies, 
like ANT, because their transformative capacity is also, to an extent, disconnected, from certain 
bodies through obedience affects – from words reproduced consistently in published texts to 
the routinized work of power station employees that helps nudge chains of electrons to 
electronically display those texts. To rephrase Deleuze and Guattari (2004: 500): never believe 
that a joyful encounter alone will suffice to save us. And this maxim applies as much to the 
transformative potential of zero-carbon homes as it does affective ANT.  
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